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Ph i l o s o p h y  a n d  T h e o l o g y
Debates over the moral status of embryonic human life continue unabated.1 In 
an article devoted to exploring Martha Nussbaum’s book Hiding from Humanity, 
John Haldane notices that although Nussbaum defends other vulnerable, dependant, 
and underdeveloped human beings, she is silent about the moral status of the 
unborn—though her inclusive principles and emphasis on capabilities rather than 
actual performative function would seem to suggest that human beings in utero should 
be accorded moral status and protection by law (Journal o f Applied Philosophy, 
November 2008).1 2
Although Nussbaum does state her opposition to sex-selection abortion, Haldane 
asks where she stands on the moral status of the unborn. She responds,
First of all, it would appear that nobody consistently regards the fertilized 
ovum as a full-fledged person. Although this theological doctrine is paid 
lip service, people’s practices suggest that it is not strictly interpreted. No 
religion holds funerals when there is a miscarriage. Women’s menses are 
not inspected to see whether they contain a fertilized egg that has failed to 
implant. These facts suggest that even strict Roman Catholics do not really 
think that a person has died in such cases, or at least that they hold this in a 
half-hearted and not fully consistent way.3
1 See Bernard G. Prusak, “The Problem with the Problem of the Embryo,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82.3 (Summer 2008): 503-521; Charles C. Camosy, 
“Common Ground on Surgical Abortion? Engaging Peter Singer on the Moral Status of 
Potential Persons,” Journal o f  Medicine and Philosophy 33.6 (December 2008): 577-593; 
Elizabeth Harman, “How Is the Ethics of Stem Cell Research Different from the Ethics of 
Abortion?” Metaphilosophy 38.2-3 (April 2007): 207-225.
2Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from  Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
3 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Hiding From Humanity: Replies to Charlton, Haldane, 
Archard, and Brooks,” Journal o f Applied Philosophy 25.4 (October 17, 2008): 335-349.
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Of course, we generally do not know if and when an embryo or, to use Nussbaum’s 
dehumanizing term, “fertilized egg” has died in utero, so it is not inconsistency but 
ignorance that prevents due acknowledgment of the loss of human life, a lack of 
knowledge that would probably not be remedied by inspecting women’s menses.
Nussbaum’s assertion that “no religion holds funerals when there is a miscar­
riage” admits a few exceptions. The Catholic Church teaches that “the corpses of 
human embryos and fetuses, whether they have been deliberately aborted or not, 
must be respected just as the remains of other human beings,” so miscarried babies 
can indeed receive Catholic funerals (canon 1183.2).4 Likewise, Protestant churches 
have conducted funeral services following both miscarriages and abortions. In 
Islam, funeral prayers should be said for a fetus if death occurs after ensoulment.5 In 
Buddhism, the mizuko kuyo is a memorial service performed for the deceased hu­
man fetus. In Hinduism, the unborn are depicted as having great value from the very 
beginning of their lives (immediate hominization), having abilities similar to mature 
human persons such as hearing, learning, and remembering in utero, and in the case 
of premature death, prayers are offered for their departed souls.6 Orthodox Judaism is 
an exception that proves too much, for in this tradition no funeral is required unless 
the baby survives thirty days after birth. So unless Nussbaum is willing to deny moral 
status to newborn babies in the first month of life, appeal to this Jewish practice will 
not be of much help in denying the moral status of the unborn human being.
Even if Nussbaum were correct in saying that no religion offered funerals 
following miscarriage, it would still not follow that not conducting funeral services 
for miscarriages indicates a tacit denial of the moral status of human beings prior 
to birth. If one understood funerals as services for the sake of the living, to comfort 
and console them in their loss, rather than as services owed to the dead for their 
own sake, in cases where little or no loss is experienced by the living, as when the 
deceased human being was not known well, there would be no need for a funeral. 
Needless to say, the fact that the death of a human being is not experienced as a loss 
or cause for sadness by other human beings does not change the moral status that 
the deceased human being had prior to death. Moral status does not depend on other 
people’s emotional states.
In an article critiquing Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal 
Case Against Abortion (Dean Stretton, “Critical Notice—Defending Life: A Moral 
and Legal Case Against Abortion by Francis J. Beckwith,” Journal o f Medical Ethics, 
November 2008), Dean Stretton offers different arguments to deny moral status to 
human embryos. The standard argument from size holds that the embryo is too small 
to have basic moral status equal to larger human beings. In a variation of the argument
4 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum vitae (February 22, 1987), I, 4.
5 Muhammad Saed Abdul-Rohman, Islam: Questions and Answers, vol. 29, Juris­
prudence and Islamic: Transactions—Part 8 (London: MSA Publication, 2004), 124-126.
6 See Swasti Bhattacharyya, Magical Progeny, Modern Technology: A Hindu Bioethics 
o f Assisted Reproductive Technology (New York: State University of New York Press, 
2006), 86.
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from size, Stretton asks us to imagine a species called shrinkers that begin as embryos 
then grow through various stages of development towards maturity as rational adults. 
After a few years in the stage of functioning rational adults, they begin to shrink and 
regress all the way through the developmental stages to the zygotic stage, where they 
can remain alive as zygotes for five years. There is no way for shrinkers to regain 
functional rationality. Stretton holds that we do nothing wrong in cutting short their 
lifespan. Since shrinkers do not have a right to live by virtue of having a natural 
capacity for rationality, neither do human embryos have a right to live by virtue of 
having a natural capacity for rationality.
How could a pro-life advocate respond? Size itself is completely irrelevant to 
personhood. If healthy adult human beings were somehow shrunk to tiny size but 
otherwise continued normally, no one would deny their right to live. So let us posit 
a slightly different case of shrinkers to focus our intuitions on morally relevant 
characteristics. Imagine beings that do not shrink but remain basically the same size 
in maturity. However, like shrinkers, these beings who were once able to function 
rationally will never rationally function again. They have permanently lost their 
ability to speak, make decisions, or think logically. Indeed, we do not need to merely 
imagine such beings because they already exist. Human beings who are severely 
mentally handicapped fit the bill, at least those who have become handicapped as 
adults. Patients with advanced Alzheimer’s are in the same condition, as are human 
beings with severe senility. Since it is morally wrong to intentionally kill these human 
beings, it would also be wrong to kill shrinkers, whether they are small or not. Thus, 
shrinkers provide no basis for denying basic respect to the human embryo.
Of course, the pro-choice advocate may say that it is not wrong to intentionally 
kill patients with advanced Alzheimer’s or victims of accidents who become severely 
mentally handicapped, but such a contention is deeply controversial, and one can 
hardly establish the truth of one controversial claim (embryos lack human rights) 
by means of another, perhaps even more controversial claim.
Stretton offers a further argument: “At the first cell division, the single-celled 
zygote fissions into two duplicate cells. But no substance can survive fission into 
duplicates, and so we cannot identify the single-celled zygote with the subsequent 
organism” (797). Surely, the human person is a substance, but if so, the human person 
cannot begin as a single-celled zygote.
One premise of Stretton’s argument is that the single-celled zygote fissions into 
two duplicates, but it remains unclear whether the two cells are really duplicates, that 
is, if duplicates are understood to be identical cells. “Its first cleavage is from one cell 
to two. Subsequent cleavages are asynchronous. First one of the two cells divides; 
there are now three cells. Then the second cell divides to result in a total of four 
cells.” 7 The first cell division in the zygote gives rise to two cells, one of which will 
give rise to the embryo proper; the other of which will give rise to the trophoblast.8
7 Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense o f  Human Life (New 
York: Doubleday, 2008), 42.
8 Ibid., 154-155.
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Since these first two cells differ in their developmental paths, giving rise to different 
parts of the embryo, they would seem not to be exact duplicates or identical. So the 
differing developmental paths of the first two cells of the human embryo show that 
the single-celled zygote does not fission into two exactly identical cells.
The second premise of Stretton’s argument is the claim that a substance cannot 
survive fission into duplicates, and this premise is also dubious. For instance, in the 
division of a tapeworm into two, one might describe this as a fission in which each 
half is basically a duplicate of the other. Must we also say that this means the original 
tapeworm died or ceased to exist, giving rise to two offspring tapeworms? Another 
possibility is to describe the division as a form of budding. A large section of the 
original has been cut off, allowing both the original tapeworm (now diminished) 
and the piece cut off now to survive independently. The initial division of the zygote 
could be described as the first cell giving rise to another cell and, though diminished 
in size, surviving the production of this other cell.
Stretton provides another argument against the idea that the early human 
embryo is the same being as the human fetus, let alone the human newborn. “The 
vast majority of the cells in the very early embryo go towards the creation of the 
placenta and amniotic sac rather than the later embryo. Thus we cannot identify the 
very early embryo with the later embryo, because the very early embryo has a better 
claim to being identical with the placenta or amniotic sac” (797).
As David Oderberg points out in his article, “The Metaphysical Status of the 
Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited,” the false assumption of this argument is 
that the placenta and amniotic sac are not parts of the human being in question, but 
something other than the human embryo (Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, November 
2008). In fact, both the placenta and amniotic sac are quite plausibly regarded 
as organs of the developing human being. They share the genetic makeup of the 
embryonic human being rather than that of the mother. Their function is similar to 
any other organ, namely to serve the good of the whole organism. The fact that these 
organs are shed at a later stage of development does not entail that they are not parts 
of the human being at an earlier stage of development. Some parts or developmental 
aspects of a human being, like baby teeth or secondary sex characteristics, are not 
present in all stages of human development. The fact that certain parts can be lost, as 
in the case of baby teeth, or gained, as in the case of secondary sex characteristics, 
as the human organism moves through the various stages of development does not 
entail that baby teeth or secondary sex characteristics are not really a part of a human 
being during a given stage of life.
Even if the placenta and amniotic sac were not parts of the human being in 
question, there is still reason to reject Stretton’s argument, for it would still not follow 
that the very early embryo is identical with the placenta or amniotic sac which arose 
from the trophoblast. The very early embryo cannot be identical with the placenta, 
amniotic sac, or even the later human embryo because there are many important 
differences among them. Many things are true of the early embryo but not true of the 
placenta or amniotic sac, most obviously size. If we construe “identical” as meaning 
“arising from,” then the placenta, amniotic sac, and the later human embryo all are 
identical with the very early embryo.
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In another argument, commonly known as the “embryo rescue case,” Stretton 
imagines a scenario in which an emergency arises and a person is faced with the 
choice of rescuing ten frozen human embryos or five adult patients. Since virtually 
everyone would choose to save the adult patients rather than the embryos, this indi­
cates that the patients have a higher moral status than the frozen human embryos.
However, we have moral justification for treating human beings enjoying equal 
basic moral status in different ways. If forced to choose between saving the President 
of the United States and four other heads of state, rather than ten unknown patients, 
most people would choose to rescue the world leaders. To choose to save presidents 
and prime ministers rather than ordinary persons is not a denial of the equal basic 
rights of those not saved, but rather a recognition that the deaths of the heads of 
state would most likely lead to greater adverse consequences than the deaths of the 
unknown patients. Similarly, in the embryo rescue case, by virtue of the fact that 
the adult patients have received an “investment” from their parents and society in 
terms of education and upbringing, have future plans that would be thwarted, have 
responsibilities to discharge, and have strong relationships with others, it makes sense 
to choose to save five adult persons rather than ten frozen embryos. The embryo 
rescue case does not show that human embryos lack basic human rights.9
Consider one more argument against the basic dignity of the human embryo. 
Human beings are organisms that have various parts which contribute to the good 
of the whole. By contrast, a bag of marbles or a heap of shoes consists of various 
individual things in proximity to one another, but each of the things is a “free agent” 
without a role in an organized structure, unfettered to making contributions to the 
whole. Some defenders of lethal embryonic research claim that the cells of the early 
human embryo within the embryonic membrane known as the zona pellucida are 
akin to a bag of marbles rather than to an organism since the various cells do not 
interact with each other for the sake of the whole.
One difficulty with the bag of marbles analogy is that there is evidence that 
the cells of the early human embryo are interacting with one another and becoming 
specialized so as to contribute to the development of a mature human body. As 
Robert George and Christopher Tollefson argue in their book Embryo: A Defense 
o f Human Life, the early human embryo, if things go right, achieves certain goals, 
including preventing more than one sperm from fertilizing the egg, moving into the 
uterus, making implantation possible, and overcoming various threats to its continued 
existence. To achieve these goals, the cells of the early embryo must work together 
in an organized way.
Modifying the bag of marbles argument, others like Stretton admit some inter­
action between the cells but posit that the interaction is insufficient for the being to be 
considered an organism or that it is unclear whether or not the being is an organism. 
If human embryos are not organisms, however, what is it that makes these loose col­
lection of cells accomplish the tasks that embryos regularly accomplish? If there is no
9 See also S. Matthew Liao, “The Embryo Rescue Case,” Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 27.2 (April 2006): 141-147.
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inner unity and directedness to the embryo, how can the “bag of marbles” become 
later what is uncontroversially recognized as an organism? The level of organization 
of the early embryo is sufficient to regularly accomplish what is needed to prevent 
more than one sperm from fertilizing the egg, to make implantation possible, and to 
overcome various threats to its continued existence, and so the level of interaction 
and organization is sufficient for the early embryo to be an organism. After all, the 
tasks achieved by the human embryo are more complex and they involve greater 
coordination than the complexity and tasks achieved by one-celled organisms, such 
as monerans, protozoans, and protists, which are uncontroversially recognized as 
organisms in their own right.
In achieving these goals, the various cells of the embryo must work together, 
communicate to overcome obstacles to achieve the goals, and develop further cells 
of greater specialization. George and Tollefson cite Bruce Carlson, an embryologist 
who notes,
Even at the early stage the blastomeres of a cleaving embryo are not homog­
enous. Simple staining methods reveal pronounced differences among cells 
in human embryos as early as the seven-cell stage. Autoradiographic studies 
have shown that all blastomeres of four-cell human embryos have low levels of 
extranucleolar and nonnucleolar RNA synthesis. By the eight-cell stage, some 
blastomeres have very high levels of RNA synthesis, but other blastomeres still 
show the pattern seen in blastomeres of the four-cell embryo. Morphological 
studies show corresponding differences between transcriptionally active and 
inactive blastomeres (154).
The early embryo is not, in other words, akin to a bag of marbles without internal 
ordering of parts coordinating activity for the sake ofthe good of the whole organism. 
Rather, even at the earliest stages, the parts have begun to differentiate themselves 
from one another for the sake of accomplishing the goal of further development 
toward human maturity.10 *
Some people have noted that the embryo does indeed have directedness toward 
human maturity, but they object that the embryo lacks the inner directedness char­
acteristic of an organism. The embryo’s developmental trajectory is governed by 
maternal RNA, not by the embryo’s own genetic endowment. In the words of Stretton, 
“organisms during their early stages exhibit self-directed development, or in other 
words development ‘from within’; but the zygote’s development until the four to eight 
cell stage is externally directed by the mother’s RNA (inherited from the ovum), and 
so the zygote during this phase is not an organism” (797). William Saletan in a New 
York Times book review of George and Tollefsen’s Embryo: A Defense o f Human 
Life raises the same objection that maternal RNA directs the early embryo’s growth, 
rather than the embryo developing itself toward greater human maturity.11
10 See also Maureen Condic, When Does Human Life Begin? A Scientific Perspective 
(Thornwood, NY: Westchester Institute for Ethics and the Human Person, 2008), reprinted 
in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9.1 (Spring 2009): 129-149.
“William Saletan, “Little Children,” New York Times, February 10, 2008, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/02/10/books/review/Saletan-t.html.
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George and Tollefsen respond:
The RNA is “maternal” only in the sense that it is contributed by the oocyte.
But as human embryologist Maureen Condic explains, “once an embryo has 
come into existence, the maternally derived RNA, like the embryo’s genome, 
belong to the embryo itself. They are not components of the mother, somehow 
acting at a distance, but components of the embryo acting to further its own 
development.” They form aspects of the complete developmental program of 
the embryo and are neither extrinsic nor distinct agents. (Nor do they cause the 
embryo of some early stage to become a numerically different being.) These 
facts discredit Saletan’s claim—central to his case against our position—that 
“maternal factors don’t just facilitate the embryo’s program; they direct it.”
The truth is that the embryo’s development is internally directed. The embryo 
directs not only its own integral organic functioning, but also its development 
in the direction of maturity as a member of the human species.12
No one denies that the early embryo, and indeed the later embryo and human fetus, 
are influenced by many maternal factors. Indeed, the influence goes both ways, 
with the mother being influenced also by even the early embryo. Such two-way 
interactions continue after birth when newborns nurse, and oxytocin is released as 
a result of this nursing in the mother’s body. But none of these mutual influences or 
interactions undermines the identities of mother and child as distinct organisms of 
the species Homo sapiens.
Does the human embryo deserve to be protected by law and welcomed in life? 
In light of the critiques brought forward by George, Tollefsen, and Oderberg, the 
considerations provided by Nussbaum, Stretten, and Saletan offer no sound argu­
ment for a negative answer. The denial of equal basic worth to the human embryo 
looks more and more like a conclusion in search of an argument.
Christopher Kaczor, Ph .D.
Loyola Marymount University 
Los Angeles, CA
12 Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, “Embryonic Debate: A Reply to 
William Saletan, Liberal Bioethics Writer, Former Embryo,” National Review Online, 
February 11, 2008, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=Y2IxM2QzNDc4OTJhNmJjODEz 
MDBiYjRiZjQyOTg3YWM=.
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